Table of Distances As Shown Over Arizona Highways

that the reference of the certificate of title act did not by inference extend to the new highway act, even though the latter act conflicted with the act sought to be repealed.

"In other words," says the court, "the vote of the legislature approving the particular measure referred is nullified, and that particular measure can only become a law when approved by the voters. Nowhere in the constitution can be found even a suggestion that a referendum petition has any effect except the nullification of the particular measure referred until its approval by the voters, which inferentially would leave the legislature in full possession of all other ordinary constitutional powers.

"Taken into consideration with consistent interpretation is that, when an act of the legislature is referred, that particular act is suspended in its operation, but that such suspension does not deprive the legislature of the right thereafter to pass, in the legal manner, any measure it may deem advisable, notwithstanding such measure may deal with exactly the same subject as the referred act, and in the same manner."

HISTORY OF REFERENDUM

The court then takes up the history of the referendum in Arizona, in the declared spirit that "any system which preserves unimpaired, the right of the people to adopt or prevent any legislation they wish complies with the spirit of the initiative and referendum," and proceeds to apply the position of Secretary Kerby, as already defined, to the present system, to the end of finding out what would result.

"According to respondent," says the court, "even though an admittedly vital defect might be discovered in chapter 78" the certificate of title act "which only affected one part of that act, the unanimous legislature, with the approval of the governor and the acquiescence of the entire electorate cannot change one single clause of the law until after the next general election, for it must be inferred from the fact that the people referred a law entirely repealing chapter 78 that they wanted it to stand without change till that time at least. Is this reasonable?

"Carry the argument one step farther. What is the situation should the voters at the polls fail to approve the repealing law? There are but two possible answers.

"First, it may be held that, by failing to approve the repealing law, they havein effect approved chapter 78," and that chapter 78 from that time forward is "forever beyond the power of the legislature to modify in the slightest degree, notwithstanding at the election the elec tors were never told they were passing on the merits of chapter 78, or that a failure to approve its repeal would establish every clause therein permanently, beyond the power of amendment by the legislature.

ARIZONA HIGHWAYS

"Even counsel for the respondent," remarks the court, "do not claim this would be the effect of a disapproval of the referred act."

DOCTRINE REFUTES SELF

Well, then, reasons the court, either it is or it isn't. Either the referred act must be subject to amendment, after the reference has been decided by the people, or altogether immune from it. Having decided that total immunity from amendment is ridiculous, "the only other alternative," says the court, "is that chapter 78 would then be subject to repeal, either in to or in part, by the legislature.

"In other words, when 5000 voters refer the repeal to the people, on the theory that chapter 78 should not be repealed but should stand, the hands of the legislature are tied, but as soon as 50,000 voters say 'We agree with you, chapter 78 should not be repealed,' by that refusal to approve the appeal, the legislature is given the immediate right to repeal it the very thing the voters have said they do not want done, and which it could not do until they had refused permission to do it.

"It seems to us that the mere statement of such a doctrine refutes itself, and yet in response to a written question by this court on this very point, counsel for respondent have in their supplemental brief stated this to be their position."

The court then proceeds to examining what would happen under the opposite theory invoked by counsel for the highway commission. An act is supposed to have been adopted covering the general subject of fraudulent conveyances in all its phases. It is in force for two years and the legislature for some reason repeals it entirely.

"A referendum," continues the court, "is promptly invoked against the repealing law, and by such act the effect of the latter is suspended until the next general election. The fraudulent conveyancing code remains, of course, so far as the repealing law is concerned, in full effect, and if the legislature acts nofurther, it will so remain until the general election.

November, 1927 APPROVAL OF LAW

"If the people disapprove the repealing law, the original statute is then sustained. Let us suppose, however, that the members of the legislature have discussed this question with their constituents after the reference of the repealing act, and have come to the conclusion that the objection was to the repeal of the law in toto, with no substitute provided for it, and therefore, when convened in special session, or even at the same session, they again pass a repealing law providing for a substitute for the original law.

"Or it may even be that they think they have convinced their constituents that an entire repeal of the law was advisable, and they pass a statute exactly the same as the first repealing statute. If the people in the interim have decided on second thought that the later action of the legislature is wise, no referendum petition will be filed, and the law will be repealed, not by authority of the referred repealing statute, but the authority of the new and unreferred one.

"If, on the other hand, the electorate are of the same mind as they were in the first place, they have the same remedy as before, for there is no limitation to the number of referendums that may be filed, any more than there is a limitation on the number of statutes which may be passed, and again the will of the people has prevailed.

"If both the legislature and the people persist in their original idea the will of the people will always prove superior to that of the legislature, for not matter how many laws in the legislature may pass, the people always have 90 days from the time of the adjournment of the session of the legislature which passed the last act, in which to place their suspensive veto thereon, while in case the people have changed their minds, the evil existing in the opinion of the legislature may be remedied without delay.

WILL OF PEOPLE

"Respondent's theory would establish the rule that the will of the people, once expressed, allows for no change of opinion for a fixed period. That of petitioners, to the contrary, while fully protecting every right of the voters to suspend an act of the legislature, allows them to alter their minds at any time.

"To sum up, under petitioners' con